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INTRODUCTION

It is difficult to evaluate someone who at the same time is evaluating you-putting you under the glass, dissecting your culture, laws, profession, and norms of political fairness.' The outsider's task is
formidable enough: first seeing, then addressing, defects in the culture
in which all of us, including the outsider, are immersed.2 But when one
* Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D., University of California at Berkeley, 1974.
1. On the general difficulty of evaluating non-mainstream legal scholarship, see Pierre
Schlag, Prefigurationand Evaluation, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 965 (1992). On "outsider" scholarship in

general, see, for example, Derrick A. Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well (Basic Books, 1992);
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar:Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature,132 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 561 (1984).
2. Immersion in the culture causes even the marginalized to internalize its precepts. See, for
example, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1258, 1288-91 (1992).
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sets out, as Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry do in a recent article, to
come to terms with outsider scholarship fairly and sympathetically, the
task's difficulty increases by an order of magnitude.'
Empowered groups long ago established a host of stories, narratives, conventions, and understandings that today, through repetition,
seem natural and true.4 Among these are criteria of judgment-the
terms and categories by which we decide which things are good, valid,
worthy, and true.5 Today, newcomers are telling their own versions, including counterstories,whose purpose is to reveal the contingency, partiality, and self-serving quality of the stories on which we have been
relying to order our world.' These new stories naturally strike us as
challenging-as indeed they often are designed to be. Some within the
mainstream have dismissed the new stories as false, manipulative, "political"-or not law.7 More moderate critics like Farber and Sherry urge
that we take the newcomers seriously, identify when their workproduct
is valid and when it is not, and lay down standards for evaluating it
when it is.$

What both types of critics tend to overlook is that majoritarians
tell stories too. But the ones they tell-about merit, causation, blame,
responsibility, and racial justice-do not seem to them like stories at
all, but the truth.9 In a series of articles, I have pointed out the difficulty confronting an outsider-one writing an abolitionist essay, for ex3.

See Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal

Narratives,45 Stan L. Rev. 807 (1993). Farber and Sherry set out their own version of what outsider scholarship is, focusing mainly on critical race theory and feminism; identify the role and
functions of narratives in outsider scholarship; address the relationship between "voice" and narrative scholarship; and offer an approach to evaluating scholarship employing the narrative, or
"storytelling," mode. For other critiques of outsider and narrative jurisprudence, see Randall Kennedy, Minority Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (1989); Mark Tushnet, The
Degradation of ConstitutionalDiscourse, 81 Georgetown L. J. 251 (1992).
4. See Catharine MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard,
1987); Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, 818 (1992);
Richard Delgado, Mindset and Metaphor, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1872, 1874-75 (1990); Elizabeth Spellman, Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought 159 (Beacon, 1988).
5. Delgado, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1874-77 (cited in note 4).
6. On the role and function of counterstories, see Derrick A. Bell, And We Are Not Saved:
The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice 1-10 (Basic Books, 1987) (using myth and fiction to probe
America's racial history and consciousness); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and
Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 (1989) (discussing storytelling and counterstorytelling as means of oppositional reform).
7. See the authorities cited in note 3. On the "not law" criticism levelled at critical legal
studies, see Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J. Legal Ed. 222 (1984).
8. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 824-30 (cited in note 3) (Part Il.B, Stories from
the "Bottom"); id. at 830-54 (Part IV, Standards for Evaluating Stories as Scholarship).
9. Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 818 (cited in note 4) (reasoning that majoritarian concepts
and practices come to seem unexceptionable, i.e., true "the way things are").
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ample, or a novel argument for law reform. 10 New stories are always
interpreted and judged in terms of the old.1 One that differs too drastically from the standard account will strike the listener as extreme, false,
or unworthy of belief.12 Unless the storyteller is exceptionally ingenious,
the scope for change through remonstrance, argument, and other verbal
means is much more limited than we like to think. Jean Stefancic and I
invented the term "empathic fallacy"' 3 to describe this limitation. The
difficulty it highlights confronts the reformist storyteller with a formidable task. What about the mainstream scholar who wishes to understand, empathize, and evaluate the outsider? As Pierre Schlag has put
4
it, evaluation is very hard to do.1
Farber and Sherry have written easily the most sustained treatment of outsider scholarship. 5 Their argument is detailed and scholarly; they cite us chapter and verse. Yet, a number of lapses, large and
small, mar an otherwise commendable effort. Part II of this Article
identifies a number of these lapses. Part III explains in greater detail
why evaluation of outsider scholarship is so hard-and so easy. The
Parts work together as follows: The mistakes and failures I highlight in
Farber's and Sherry's treatment of outsider jurisprudence illustrate a
more general difficulty, which I set out in Part III. My conclusion is
that the near impossibility of fairly treating new scholarly movements
counsels against laying down evaluative criteria during those movements' early stages.

II.

ERRORS AND MISSTATEMENTS

The footnotes of the Farber-Sherry article disclose a broad familiarity with outsider scholarship; they quote or cite many of the major
10. See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?: Law Reform, CriticalLibrarianship,and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 207 (1989); Richard
Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?,69
Tex.L. Rev. 1929 (1991); Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1258 (cited in note 2).
11. See, for example, Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1279; Delgado and
Stefancic, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 1957.
12. See Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1279. On the many ways in which some

writers in the legal mainstream continue to marginalize new scholarship, see Richard Delgado, The
ImperialScholar Revisited: How to MarginalizeOutsider Writing, Ten Years Later, 140 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1349 (1992).
13. See Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1261. See also id. at 1278-79 (reasoning
that new stories always are screened and interpreted through the medium of the old and that ones
that are radical departures always are rejected); id. at 1280-82 (designating the belief that we may
somehow escape this limitation the "empathic fallacy").
14. Schlag, 80 Cal. L. Rev. at 965 (cited in note 1).
15. Other treatments, such as Mark Tushnet, The Degredationof ConstitutionalDiscourse,
80 Georgetown L. J. 251; Mary Coombs, Outsider Scholarship:The Law Review Stories, 63 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 683 (1992); or Edward Rubin, On Beyond Truth, 80 Cal. L. Rev. 889 (1992), in my
opinion are less successful than that of Farber and Sherry.
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writers and themes.16 Yet the sections of their article concerned with
describing 17 and identifying a range of valid functions for the new
genres18 contain a number of curious lapses. These errors, committed by
serious and careful commentators, cast doubt on the entire evaluative
enterprise. For, if observers as well-intentioned as these two go astray,
how will others less generously inclined apply the criteria they end up
proposing? I point out some of the more notable errors and misinterpretations for two reasons. First, it is important to clear up the errors in
themselves; I have noticed that mainstream writers frequently accept
their colleagues' descriptions of outsider jurisprudence as true without
troubling to consult the original sources. 9 Second, the deficiencies in
the Farber-Sherry article cast doubt on the entire enterprise of evaluating outsider scholarship by insider standards. In Part III, I offer a theoretical explanation for that difficulty and a suggestion for what we
ought to do in the meantime. The oversights and omissions noted in
Part II, then, supply the evidence for the theory in Part III.
A.

Thematic Errors and Misconceptions

1. Equation of Outsider Jurisprudence With Narrative Scholarship
I love stories and narratives; indeed, I have written frequently in
this mode myself.20 Indeed, four years ago I wrote a letter to the Michigan Law Review that resulted in a symposium issue on legal storytelling.2 . Yet, not all outsider scholarship takes the form of stories or
chronicles. Many classics of the critical race theory (CRT) genre, 2 such
as Derrick Bell's Serving Two Masters23 or Kimberle Crenshaw's article
16. For example, Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 814-19 (cited in note 3) (Part II.B)
(citing, among others, Alex Johnson, Sharon Rush, Jerome Culp, Randall Kennedy, Richard Delgado, Mar Matsuda, Patricia Williams, Derrick Bell, Lucinda Finley, Robin Barnes, Robert Williams, Stephanie Wildman, Martha Fineman, Catharine MacKinnon, Toni Massaro, Stephen
Carter, Duncan Kennedy, and Gary Peller).
17. Id. at 809-19 (Part H).
18. Id. at 819-30 (Part I).
19. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Delgado, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 1364-65 (cited in
note 12).
20. See, for example, Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Chronicle, 101 Yale L. J. 1357 (1992); Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Law Reform: Will We Ever Be Saved?, 97 Yale L. J.
923 (1988) (book review); Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionistsand Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 (1989).
21. Letter from Richard Delgado to Kevin Kennedy, editor in chief, Michigan Law Review,
June 1, 1988 (on file with author). See Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2073
(1989).
22. Farber and Sherry use two examples of outsider jurisprudence to illustrate their thesis
about storytelling-feminism, Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 810-14 (Part II.A), and CRT,
id. at 814-19 (Part Il.B). I shall be concerned mainly with their treatment of CRT.
23. Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters, 85 Yale L. J. 470 (1974).
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on transformation and legitimation, 4 are written in the standard casespolicies-arguments mode. Stefancic and I recently completed an extensive annotated bibliography of CRT, in the course of which we read
every article and book that arguably fell within the corpus.2 5 At most,
one-quarter of the works could be described as written in the storytelling or narrative mode. This is not a minor quibble: Farber and
Sherry focus on the alleged defects of narrative jurisprudence, yet often
impute them to CRT as a whole.
2.

Narrative Scholarship and the "Different Voices" Debate

Farber and Sherry write that the case for stories rests on showing
that minority scholars write in a different voice, something that has not
yet been done. 6 Unlike with women, where the work of Carol Gilligan
established an empirical basis for the claim of differentness, 2 7 with the
voice of color, distinctness has not yet been shown. Farber and Sherry
reason that there may be a political (leftist) voice, or one of the poor,
but aside from these commonalities, minority scholars share little.2 8
Some scholars of color are leftist activists, others moderate, still others
conservative. What common voice could all of them have, Farber and
Sherry ask-and why cannot a white progressive write in the "voice of
color?"2 9
Voice is a false issue. The best evidence of storytelling's usefulness
lies in the stories themselves. One could argue as well that wolves do
not howl, since some howl in a high key, others in a low one, and still
others not at all, while some creatures that are not wolves howl as well.
The point is not to impose some requirement (of dubious relevance) of
uniqueness with respect to howling or legal storytelling, but to learn
something about or from the behavior itself.
3.

Stories Are Useless Without Analysis and Reasoned Argument

In oral presentations of their paper, Farber and Sherry illustrated
one of their reservations about stories by telling one themselves-an
anecdote about the young daughter of one of them who crayoned on an
24. Kimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform and Retrenchment: Transformationand Legitimation
in Antidiscrimination, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1331 (1988).
25. Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, CriticalRace Theory: An Annotated Bibliography,
79 Va. L. Rev. 461 (1993).
26. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 809-19 (Part H).
27. See Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice 69-105 (1982); Carol Gilligan and Jane Attanuci,
Two Moral Orientations,in Carol Gilligan, Janie Ward, and Jill Taylor, eds., Mapping the Moral
Domain: A Contribution of Women's Thinking to Psychological Theory and Education 73
(Harvard, 1988).
28. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 815-18.
29. Id. at 818-19.
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upholstered chair and, when scolded, generalized the wrong lesson. s 0
Their point is that stories in themselves teach little unless supplemented with analysis and commentary that will enable the reader to
connect the story with a more general rule or principle."1
True, but irrelevant 2-most of us already follow this counsel. In
perhaps the most notable example of legal storytelling, Derrick Bell and
his interlocutor, Geneva, agree that their conversations must include
statistics, case authority, and doctrinal analysis lest their colleagues reject their work as nonrigorous.3 3 Most of us instinctively follow Bell's
example; only a handful of the articles we reviewed consisted of
unadorned narratives. Narratives, standing alone, of the sort Farber
and Sherry condemn, are rare.
4.

Overlooking the Deconstructionalist Tale, or "Counterstory"

When Farber and Sherry write of outsider stories, they seem to be
thinking of just one kind-the personal account or description of the
author's experience. They speak of "agony tales, 3' 4 of "unadorned" narratives3 5 and the virtues of concreteness in legal scholarship.38 They
conclude by finding a narrow place for storytelling, but only as an adjunct to traditional analysis and commentary.
This approach neglects a second, much more important type of
narrative, namely the counterstory3 s Majoritarians tell stories, as I
noted earlier, but with the conviction that they are not stories at all,
but the truth.38 Accordingly, many CRT writers employ the "counterstory" to jar, mock, or displace a tenet of the majoritarian faith.3 9 These
tales are not so much aimed at setting forth a minority view, or how the
writer felt about a given experience (e.g., experiencing discrimination
30. See, for example, Address by Daniel Farber and Suzanna Sherry, Yale Law School, Oct.
1992. The same story also appeared in an earlier draft of their article (manuscript on file with
author).
31. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 846-53 (Part IV).
32. See text accompanying notes 77-84 (discussing the connection between practical reason
and storytelling).
33. For example, Derrick Bell, Foreward:The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 4,
14-36 (1985) (cited in note 6); Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2418-22 (cited in note 6). But see Bell,
And We Are Not Saved at 43 (observing that even dazzling analysis may fall to persuade skeptical
white readers).
34. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 835-38.
35. Id. at 848-51.
36. Id. at 822-24.
37. See Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2413-18, 2429-35.
38. See text accompanying notes 2-5, 9-12; Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 818 (cited in note
4).
39. See, for example, Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2438; Bell, And We Are Not Saved (illustrating the use of chronicles and counterstories aimed at challenging the dominant stories of race).
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while shopping). Rather, they are aimed at challenging one of the inscribed and blithely repeated accounts by which majoritarians make
sense of their world; stories such as: without intent, no discrimination;
outright racism is rare and sporadic; we have all the civil rights legislation and case law we need-any more would disadvantage innocent
whites; some cultures unfortunately have less ambition and ability than
others; and so on.40
It is curious that Farber and Sherry neglected this genre, focusing
instead on the poetic cri de coeur. Yet, as I and others have pointed
out, destruction of contingent, comforting myths is often a necessary
prelude to constructing a better, fairer world.4 1 The counterstory focuses not on helping a white understand a black, but on helping a white
understand a white.
5.

The Question of Audience

Some stories, Farber and Sherry write, do not ring true42 ; others
leave the reader asking, "What am I to make of this? '43 Still others
make the reader wonder if the story is typical-how often can such a
44
terrible thing happen?
Stories, of course, may be told poorly, may leave their audience
guessing. But some outsider narratives may puzzle Farber and Sherry
simply because they require work on the reader's part,45 or are not written with him or her in mind at all. The intended audience may be progressive scholars, other crits, or the minority community itself.4 6 In the
words of a black filmmaker, "[W]e get raves from the Black community
...
[but] snarls from white male critics who insist that the film is not
about anything because it's not about anything that concerns them...
'How dare you make a film we don't understand?' ,,47
6.

Stories' Purpose and Efficacy

Finally, Farber and Sherry try to ascertain the functions of outsider stories in order to evaluate how well the stories fulfill these functions. 48 Here, Farber and Sherry carry out a great deal of armchair
40. See sources cited in notes 4 and 6 (identifying and analyzing some of these stories about
women and blacks).
41. See, for example, Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2412-18, 2429-35.
42. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 822-24 (Part HI.A.2).
43. Id. at 825-26, 830-31.
44. Id. at 838-40.
45. See text accompanying notes 82-84.
46. On the question of audience, see Regina Austin, SapphireBound!, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 539.
47. Patricia Smith, Voices Struggling to be Heard, Boston Globe A-5 (Sept. 1, 1991) (interview with Black filmmaker Julie Dash).
48. See Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 830-31 (Part I).
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analysis-stories might be good for this or that-concluding, naturally,
that none of these functions is served, except the narrow, color-neutral
49
one of illustrating practical reasoning.
But it is not necessary to speculate on storytelling's purposes. Minority narrativists have not been shy about meta-analysis, about telling
our readers what we think we are doingY' And, as for judging stories'
impact, why speculate in a vacuum? Book sales, reviews, and placement
of articles in top-tier journals5 1 might enable us to gauge stories' efficacy without the guesswork.
B.

Other Qualms and Reservations

Other inaccuracies in the Farber-Sherry article, while less serious,
nevertheless are worth noting for the reasons mentioned earlier. They
write that outsider jurisprudence has no particular content, 52 yet writers have had no difficulty in identifying a set of characteristic themes.5 3
They write that the new CRT scholars disdain analysis and empirical
research in favor of a good yarn,54 when their work probably contains as
much writing of these harder-edged types as does a similar sample of
mainstream writing.5 5 They write that minority storytelling can have
little impact on the reader, since the writer and reader will either share
a common world or not. If not, the story will be incomprehensible; if so,
it will say little new.5 6 (This argument could be used to justify throwing
away one's umbrella.)5 7 They argue that better ways exist to correct
prejudice, such as science58 (ignoring evidence that science and
prejudice have often seemed to coexist quite easily).59 They write that
stories-especially those in the first person-may be unfair, since there
49. Id. at 820-24 (Part Ill.A.1., 2.).
50. See text accompanying notes 38-40; Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2412-15, 2435-40 (identifying the functions of narratives as (i) challenging majoritarian mindset; (ii) making easy issues
harder; (iii) introducing formerly excluded perspectives; and (iv) arguing for a redefinition and new
understanding of social reform).
51. On the relatively favorable reception of critical and radical-feminist scholars by the law
reviews but the more guarded one by mainstream scholars, see Delgado, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. at
1350-51 (cited in note 12).
52. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 809-10 (Part I) (no distinctive voice or tenets).
53. See, for example, Delgado and Stefancic, 79 Va. L. Rev. at 462-63 (cited in note 25)
(identifying ten such themes); Stephanie Goldberg, The Law, A New Theory Holds, Has a White
Voice, N.Y. Times B8 (July 17, 1992).
54. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 808-09.
55. See Delgado and Stefancic, 79 Va. L. Rev. 461.
56. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 824-26, 847-50.
57. Viz., if a wild storm is blowing, an umbrella won't keep me dry; and if the rain is extremely light, I won't need one at all.
58. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 830, 835-37.
59. See, for example, Stephen J. Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (Norton, 1983).
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is no way to refute them,6" while others may be "conversation-ending
move[s].'1 (What about majoritarian stories, such as "We have looked
everywhere for a minority professor, but the pool is so small?") 62 Stories may deceive the reader by leaving out relevant facts, or by failing
to be typical of the situation described.6 3 (Every narrative, however,
leaves out something; their very point is to make sense out of the welter
of phenomena that besiege us every moment.)6 '
III.

FARBER AND SHERRY ON EVALUATING OUTSIDER SCHOLARSHIP

The outsider storyteller's task, as I mentioned earlier, is formidable
indeed.6 5 Speech is paradigm-dependent. If racism is deeply imbedded
in the very paradigm we rely on to describe and order our world, any
story that challenges that paradigm too frontally will strike the reader
as incoherent. 6 The task of the insider who sets out to understand and
order the outsider's world is even more difficult-witness the abovenoted lapses that Farber and Sherry commit in simply describing and
analyzing outsider scholarship.67 Consider next what they propose in
the way of standards for evaluating that scholarship.
The purpose of all legal scholarship, they write, is to help the
reader understand the law. 8 How does it do that? They reason that
legal scholarship helps the reader by employing reason (especially practical reason) and analysis, by offering suggestions that are generalizable
and testable.6 9 Scholarship that takes the form of storytelling may be
useful, then, but only if the stories are typical,7 0 true,"' and supported
by analysis and reason.7 2
We should hesitate to adopt these criteria for outsider scholars.
Consider the first criterion, that scholarship helps the reader understand the law. Outsider scholarship is often aimed not at understanding
60.
61.

Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 835-38.
Id. at 851.

62.

For a discussion of this standard argument, see Delgado, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1875-76

(cited in note 4).
63. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 852-53.
64. See Delgado and Stefancic, 69 Tex. L. Rev. at 1932-33, 1956-57 (cited in note 10); Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1279-81 (cited in note 2).
65. See text accompanying note 10 and sources cited therein.
66. Delgado and Stefancic, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 1279. See Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2413.
67. See notes 26-64 and accompanying text.
68. Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 809.
69. Id. at 846-51.
70. Id. at 838-40.
71. Id. at 832-35.
72. Id. at 850-54.
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the law, but at changing it."5 Or consider the requirement of typicality.
Outsiders and their experiences by definition will not be typical. Of
course, Farber and Sherry may be saying only that outsider stories
should be typical of outsider experience. But who is to decide
that-surely not one situated outside that experience.7 4 Or, take the requirement of truth. Apart from mathematics and the physical sciences,
truth is largely socially constructed.7 5 If I pronounce society unjust, and
you think it is fair and just, which of us has truth on his or her side? If,
as I argued earlier, many of the dominant narratives incorporate a
majoritarian perspective, 6 the requirement that outsider storytellers
adhere to these versions on penalty of being labelled untruthful comes
perilously close to requiring them to reject their own culture.
Finally, take the requirement of generalizability,which stories are
said to achieve only through argument and abstraction. Whom does
such a requirement benefit? Naturally, those whose experience is the
norm, whose versions of the way things are are inscribed in all the cultural rules and practices.7 7 Empowered groups do not need particularity, context, a focus on the individual.7 8 All the general rules,
presumptions, and interpretations reflect them and their understandings.7 9 Stories that too forcefully call attention to injustice, particularly
of novel sorts, will strike them as anecdotal, unprincipled, or unfair.
They will give them pejorative labels, like "agony stories," 80 deem them
conversation-closersal-all
the while overlooking that cheerful
majoritarian stories, for example about how much racial progress has
been made, strike us the same way.
73. See, for example, Delgado, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2415. See also sources cited in Delgado
and Stefancic, 79 Va. L. Rev. 461 (cited in note 25) (listing CRT articles, most of which deal with
social or legal transformation).
74. For works questioning that such an "essential" unitary experience even exists, see generally Stephen L. Carter, Reflections of an Affirmative Action Baby (Basic Books, 1991). See also
Kennedy, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 1745 (cited in note 3).
75. On the construction of the social world, see generally Peter L. Berger and Thomas
Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Doubleday, 1966). For law's role, see Delgado, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 813 (cited in note 4); Catharine MacKinnon, Toward A Feminist Theory of the
State (Harvard, 1989); MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified (cited in note 4) (discussing law's role
in constructing women's reality).
76. See notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
77. Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 818. See generally MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory; MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified.
78. See Delgado, 77 Cornell L. Rev. at 818-22. See generally Spellman, Inessential Woman
(cited in note 4).
79. See sources cited in notes 77-78.
80. Farber and Sherry, 145 Stan. L. Rev. at 835-38.
81. Id. at 851.
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Consider how these requirements might converge in the case of Patricia Williams' famous Benetton story- 2 A casual or unsympathetic reviewer easily could criticize Professor Williams for making too much of
an atypical experience. Most retail stores with which he is familiar are
happy to sell to blacks. The unsympathetic reviewer may reason that
Williams invites us to see her experience as common-which it is not,
thereby violating the criterion of truthfulness. Moreover, she offers little in the way of reasoned argument, thereby missing an opportunity to
connect her anecdote with legal doctrine and thereby aid the reader's
understanding of the law. For example, she might have drawn a lesson
about the public-private distinction, inviting the reader to question the
way various spaces in our society are relegated to the private sphere,
from which one may exclude others without giving a reason.
But this interpretation would miss Professor Williams' point. The
Benetton story is intended to prompt consideration of a new legal category, namely spirit-murder. Spirit-murder is a kind of crime; like most
crimes one may not commit it with impunity even on one's own property." Spirit-murder occurs frequently in the lives of minority people-that is why her story rings true. Her point in telling it was not to
urge a small, incremental change in the locus of the public-private line.
Rather, she intended to call attention to the law's inadequacy in a recurring situation. Focusing on the Farber-Sherry requirements-truth,
typicality, and conventional reasoned argument-might easily lead the
reader to miss the deeper truth at the heart of Professor Williams'
story.
IV.

CONCLUSION

All this counsels caution in evaluating outsiders. Empathy and understanding are difficult across large gaps of culture and experience.
Even careful observation is in short supply-slaves observed their masters far more carefully, and with more reason, than the latter did them.
Majoritarian tools of analysis, themselves only stories, inevitably will
pronounce outsider versions lacking in typicality, rigor, generalizability,
and truth. The purpose of many outsider narratives is to put our very
82. In the story, the author goes to Benetton to buy Christmas presents for her mother. She
presses the buzzer, the only way to gain entrance. But the young sales clerk, after scrutinizing her
face, denies her entry, even though other customers are present and it is not yet closing time.
Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights 44-45 (Harvard, 1991). For Farber's and
Sherry's doubts about this story, see Farber and Sherry, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 835 & n.146.
83. Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2128, 2139-43 (1989); Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger:
The Discourse of Fingerpointingas the Law's Response to Racism, 42 U. Miami L. Rev. 127, 129,
135-36, 147-54 (1987).
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ordering principles, including these, in question. Empowered groups
long ago inscribed their favorite narratives-ones that reflected their
sense of the way things ought to be-into myth and culture. Now they
profess to consult that culture, meekly and humbly, in search of standards for judging challenges to that culture.
Neat, but circular. A better approach would be to postpone efforts
to evaluate new scholarly movements. There is little urgency; most of
the voices have tenure." And, while the scholars may not all be young,
the movements are. Critical race theory, for example, held its first national workshop in the summer of 1989. As I pointed out on another
occasion, there are many things one can do with an infant-nurture it,
get to know it, observe and interact with it." But should we rush in
with evaluative criteria to rank its eyes, teeth, limbs, and brain? Sometimes it may be better to live with uncertainty a little longer, tolerate a
degree of experimentation, rather than shut off a world-crossing experiment that may one day benefit us all. 86

84. For the manner in which well-meaning senior professors often counsel young scholars of
color to postpone writing about race until they have first demonstrated their skills at mainstream
doctrinal analyses, see Delgado, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. at 561-62 (cited in note 1).
85. Richard Delgado, Comment on Mary Coombs, University of Colorado Law Review Symposium on Legal Scholarship, Boulder, Col., Feb. 1992, reprinted in part, 63 Colo. L. Rev. 721
(1992).
86. Richard Delgado, When a Story Is Just a Story: Does Voice Really Matter?, 76 Va. L.
Rev. 95, 103-05 (1990).

